

## **GOVERNANCE, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A Revisit of the Evidence<sup>1</sup>**

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### **ABSTRACT**

*Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries remain underdeveloped despite enormous human, material and natural resources. In the last two decades, the growth rates in most of the countries have fluctuated between 4 and 6 per cent annually. In some countries, the celebrated growth rates have been far less than the growth in population. In recent times, unemployment, especially among the youth has been quite high, averaging about 40 per cent. The provision of social services such as health delivery, education, running water and housing, remain a challenge.*

*Some scholars have argued that Africa is rising, pointing to impressive growth rates in some countries, but forgetting that growth is not development. Other scholars have attributed the unsatisfactory economic performance to governance challenges. The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between governance, growth, and development in SSA countries. Governance indicators such as accountability, voice, quality of leadership, rule of law, are regressed on growth and development. Using a panel regression approach, the results show that democracy,*

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*unemployment, and corruption have negative relationships with growth. On the other hand, private investment shows a positive relationship with growth and is statistically significant. Rule of law, regulatory quality and government effectiveness are negatively related to growth. But, political stability, voice, and accountability have positive impact on growth and are statistically significant. However, regulatory quality, size of government, political stability, and government effectiveness are positively linked to development but not growth. The overall results call for improvement in governance in SSA.*

JEL classification: 010, 049

**Keywords:** Voice and accountability, rule of law, government effectiveness

## **1. Introduction**

Sub-Saharan Africa is richly endowed with human and natural resources, and has the potential to lead other regions in the world. Despite her great potentials, the region remains the poorest in the world. Countries within her enclave are riddled with high poverty, lack of access to basic social and economic facilities, insecurity, stunted growth, unemployment and other economic misfortunes. Through the decades, unfavorable economic conditions have continued to ravage countries across the region and thus deepen macroeconomic vulnerabilities.

Several studies have been undertaken to buttress the underlying factors militating against economic projections in the region (Mauro, 1995; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi; 2003, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009; among others). Through policy formulation proposed by these various studies, the need to address governance pattern has taken a leading position. For instance, most of the studies showed that economic, institutional and political governance hold the key to economic growth and development in the region. Specifically, corruption was found to be a leading cause of underdevelopment. Inadequacy in governance can result in corruption which not only leads to an outrageous

increase in public investments which are inefficiently utilized, but also results in a decline in private investments.

There is a clear correlation between good governance and economic growth and development across the countries. Many cross-country studies suggest that the nature of governance, as reflected in broad institutional measures such as protection of property rights, rule of law and absence of corruption, matters for long-term growth (World Bank, 2017). Good governance plays an important role in the implementation of successful economic policies (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Amdt and Oman, 2006; Dixit, 2009, Ahlerup, Baskaran, and Bigsten, 2016).

Given the above scenario, this paper seeks to investigate the impact of governance on economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa. Following the introductory section, section 2 provides a springboard to the study by presenting stylized facts about the region; section 3 clarifies certain conceptual issues as well as the review of literature. Section 4 presents the theoretical framework, methodology and the model. Section 5 discusses the empirical results while section 6 concludes the paper.

## **2. Sub-Sahara Africa: Stylized Facts on the Economy:<sup>2</sup>**

We provide some facts on selected macroeconomic and social indicators on the economy of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to show the performance of the economy since most of the countries attained political independence in 1960.

The African Development Bank in its 2018 African Economic Outlook stressed that “African economies have been resilient: Real output is up, reflecting generally good macroeconomic policies, progress in structural reforms (especially in infrastructure development), and generally sensible policy frameworks” (AfDB, 2018, p.xiii). It appears that the AfDB is with those pundits pushing the Africa emerging/rising hypothesis. It is, therefore, not surprising that the report has not linked the recovery in growth to social outcomes – a measure of meaningful development. Tables 1 – 3 provide the direction of selected macroeconomic fundamentals in Africa for the period

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<sup>2</sup> This section draws from Ekpo (2018i).

2009 – 2019 (inclusive of projections). Analysis of previous years, 2004 – 2013 can be found in Ekpo (2016, pp.9-32). For the period, 2009 – 2019, the African economy was expected to grow at a rate of 4.6 per cent per annum.

In terms of regions, West Africa was projected to grow by 6.5 per cent, while oil-importing economies would grow by 4.3 per cent. These growth rates apart from being single-digit were slightly above the population growth rates; any external negative shock(s) could reduce the projected growth. If the big players, such as Nigeria and South Africa, are excluded, the growth trajectory would decline. It is also crucial to note that the growth figures are driven by prices of commodity exports which are volatile with inherent vulnerabilities.

For the period, 2014 – 2018, inflation in Africa was single-digit, the pattern is similar for oil-importing countries (table 2). There is no question that moderate inflation reflects some stability in African economies. It is interesting to note that single-digit inflation was also projected for 2019. On the other hand, Africa suffers from the challenge of twin deficits (table 3). Both domestic and external balances are negative for Africa, SSA and oil-importing countries. The twin deficits pose a problem for Africa's external sector. Unsustainable current account deficits reflect a poor state of the economy. The scenario discourages investors from holding assets denominated in Africa currencies which are not convertible. Large current account deficits increase the probability of a currency crisis.

**Table 1.** Real GDP Growth in Africa 2009 – 2019 (%)

Year	West Africa	SSA	Africa	Oil-Importing Countries
2009 – 2019	6.5	4.9	4.6	4.3
2014	6.0	4.9	3.8	3.9
2015	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.6
2016	0.5	1.5	2.2	2.9
2017	2.5	2.8	3.6	3.9
2018*	3.6	3.5	4.1	4.2
2019**	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.5

*Source:* African Economic Outlook 2018, African Development Bank, Abidjan. p. 30.

*Notes:* \*Estimates, \*\* Projections

**Table 2.** Inflation in Africa 2009 – 2019 (%)

Year	West Africa	SSA	Africa	Oil-Importing Countries
2009 – 2019	9.8	9.8	8.5	6.3
2014	7.3	7.5	7.1	5.4
2015	8.2	7.3	7.4	5.3
2016	12.7	11.2	10.0	6.0
2017	13.3	12.2	13.0	5.7
2018*	11.6	9.8	11.1	5.2
2019**	11.0	8.9	9.0	5.1

Source: Same as Table 1.

**Table 3.** Fiscal Balance and External Current Account (including Grants) in Africa 2009 – 2019 (% of GDP)

Year	West Africa	SSA	Africa	Oil-Importing Countries
2009 – 2019	-2.9 (1.6)	-2.8 (-1.9)	-3.4 (-1.2)	-4.3 (-5.9)
2014	-2.8 (-1.6)	-3.6 (-4.4)	-5.7 (-4.9)	-4.5 (-7.5)
2015	-3.7 (-4.2)	-4.3 (-6.2)	-7.1 (-6.8)	-4.8 (-6.7)
2016	-5.0 (-1.8)	-4.6 (-4.6)	-7.0 (-5.9)	-4.7 (-6.3)
2017	-4.8 (-1.0)	-4.5 (-3.4)	-5.7 (-4.2)	-4.5 (-5.5)
2018*	-4.4 (-1.4)	-4.1 (-3.6)	-4.7 (-3.5)	-4.3 (-5.7)
2019**	1-4.0 (-1.1)	-3.8 (-3.5)	-4.3 (-3.2)	-3.9 (-5.7)

Source: Same as Table 1.

Notes: Current account/GDP are in parenthesis

The domestic fiscal deficits are also a challenge. Africa has a large infrastructure deficit requiring huge financial commitment. Domestic revenue mobilization is low in the continent hence reliance on external finance is inevitable. There is nothing wrong in borrowing to finance the development of hard and soft infrastructure. It has long-run multiple effects for any economy; such expenditure stimulates growth and creates employment. Moreover, the magnitude of the deviation of the fiscal imbalance from the threshold is marginal.

The GDP per capita in US dollars which stood at US\$1,390.00 in 2007 trended upwards and was US\$2,183.00 in 2014 but thereafter indicated a

declining trend as a result of the impending recession in Africa. There were already signs of the economy entering a stagflation phase beginning 2012.

**Table 4.** Africa Real GDP Growth and GDP per Capita 2007 – 2015

Year	Real GDP Growth (%)	GDP per Capita (USD)
2007	6.1	1,390.00
2008	5.3	1,566.00
2009	3.5	1,794.00
2010	5.8	1,632.00
2011	2.9	1,885.00
2012	6.4	2,025.00
2013	3.9	2,146.00
2014	3.7	2,183.00
2015	3.5	1,932.00

*Source:* African Statistical Year Book 2016, AfDB

The structure of output in Africa is presented in table 5 below. Structural transformation involves large, permanent changes in the structure of production. According to the AfDB, “there is little evidence of structural change for the continent as a whole. The structural make-up of GDP remained roughly constant between 2000 and 2016. The shares of extractives in GDP increased between 2000 and 2008, declining in 2009 and then again in 2012 – 2015’ (AfDB, 2018, p.7). Nonetheless, the data in table 5 portrays a different picture and should be interpreted with caution. It seems that the service sector is now dominant, reflecting structural transformation. However, the services sector in Africa is of low quality and rudimentary in nature. The share of manufacturing in GDP remains quite low – about 11.2 per cent in 2014.

**Table 5.** Africa Structure of Output (As share of GDP %)

	2007	2014
Agriculture	16.2	16.3
Total Industry	36.7	30.9
Manufacturing	10.1	11.2
Services	46.1	52.8

*Source:* Same as Table 1.

The decomposition of growth in labour productivity in selected African countries is shown in table 6. After a persistent decline in the 1990s, labour productivity increased during the period 2000 – 2013. Labour productivity can arise from within-sector gains and from shifts of workers from less productive to more productive sectors. In 2000 – 2013, labour productivity increased by 2.21 per cent a year; within-sector growth accounted for almost 73 per cent of the increase, reflecting very little labour reallocation in the continent. The evidence for selected countries is shown in table 6. For a large economy like Nigeria, between sector labour productivity growth for 2000 – 2013 stood at -0.11 per cent reflecting that there was no structural transformation.

Figures 1-3 below show the trend of relevant macroeconomic indicators of SSA during the period 1980-2018. Private investment was at its peak in 2008/9 but declined thereafter partly due to the fall in commodity prices as well as the global financial crisis. Interest rate which was at its lowest in 2008 began to rise steadily in 2016. The rising interest rate confirms the drastic decline in private investment during the period.


During the period 1991 to 2001, the rate of unemployment exceeded the growth of GDP and the trend continued from 2014 to 2018. However, from 2002-2010, growth in GDP exceeded that of unemployment. The unemployment problem in SSA remains a major challenge particularly as the rate is growing faster among youths as well as the rate of population growth.

**Table 6.** Decomposition of Annual Growth in Labour Productivity in Selected Countries in Africa


Country	1975 – 1990			2000 – 2013		
	Average Annual Labour Productivity Growth	Within Sector Labour Productivity Growth	Between Sector Labour Productivity Growth (Structural Transformation)	Average Annual Labour Productivity Growth	Within Sector Labour Productivity Growth	Between Sector Labour Productivity Growth (Structural Transformation)
Botswana	3.77	1.34	2.43	2.38	2.23	0.15
Egypt	4.47	3.56	0.91	3.14	2.43	0.70
Ethiopia	-1.63	-1.59	-0.03	2.07	1.63	0.44
Ghana	-1.31	-1.33	-0.03	2.20	1.07	1.14
Kenya	-0.02	-0.44	0.42	0.71	-0.02	0.73
Malawi	-0.55	-0.49	-0.06	0.60	-0.61	1.21
Mauritius	2.80	2.00	0.80	4.94	-4.18	0.76
Nigeria	-1.04	-1.48	0.44	2.88	2.98	-0.11
Senegal	-1.78	-2.31	0.53	0.76	-0.12	0.88
South Africa	0.05	-1.03	1.08	3.72	3.40	0.32
Tanzania	0.03	-0.16	0.19	1.21	0.34	0.87
Zambia	-0.80	0.09	-0.89	1.85	1.76	0.09
Average	0.33	-0.15	0.49	2.21	1.61	0.06

*Source:* African Economic Outlook 2018, AfDB, p.9.






**Figure 1.** Trends in Interest rate, Private Investment, Public Investment and Unemployment Rate in Sub-Saharan Africa.



**Figure 2.** Trends of Inflation, Capital Expenditure and Private Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa.



**Figure 3.** Trends in Unemployment rate and GDP Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Table 7.** Infrastructure Access data for selected Global Reforms in 2013

Indicator	Africa	Asia	Europe	Latin America
<b>Transport</b>				
Paved road density (Km of paved road per 100 km <sup>2</sup> of land area)	2	25	122	3
Railway lines (Km)	46,380	197,610	85,986	89,002
<b>Information &amp; Communication Technology</b>				
Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 population	1	6	15	9
Mobile cellular and subscriptions per 100 population	73	85	119	115
<b>Power</b>				
Electricity Production per capital (Kwh)	572	1,930	3,355	2,116
Electricity access (% of total population)	46	88	100	97
<b>Water Supply and Sanitation</b>				
Improved water (% of total population)	69	90	99	94
Improved sanitation (% of total population)	39	61	93	82

Source: AfDB Statistical Year Book


**Table 8:** Adult Illiteracy Rate in Selected Africa Countries (%)

County	2001 – 2005	2006 – 2010	2011 – 2015
Angola	32.59	-	29.04
Botswana	18.81	-	12.11
Egypt	28.59	30.79	25.28
Ethiopia	67.14	61.00	50.91
Ghana	-	28.50	23.42
Kenya	-	27.84	22.03
Malawi	-	38.69	34.21
Mauritius	-	-	10.07
Nigeria	45.23	48.92	40.43
Rwanda	-	34.15	30.58
Senegal	60.72	54.21	48.82
South Africa	-	8.50	6.30
Tanzania	30.57	32.20	20.35
Uganda	31.86	27.71	27.97
Africa	41.17	37.03	37.03

Source: African Statistical Year Book 2016, AfDB.

The stylized facts clearly show that Africa is lagging behind as regards basic infrastructure. If Africa is to grow at a double-digit rate, then she must build hard and soft infrastructure on a consistent basis. What is the performance regarding social indicators?

The educational sector in sub-Saharan Africa has lagged behind in comparison to other regions. There is high decadence in physical educational amenities, thus reducing the effectiveness of the human resource output. Available data shows that improving the learning levels need to be urgently addressed. Data also shows that the region has the highest rate of education exclusion, with over one-fifth of children within the 6-11years age bracket out of school. There is relatively low completion rate in terms of primary and lower secondary education as can be seen in the figure 4.



**Figure 4.** Education Performance in the SSAs.

The continuous disparity in educational outcomes between countries in sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world has been a recurring problem which has long-term implications.

Sub-Saharan Africa remains one of the regions with modest health outcomes with the region bearing huge disease burden. Some of the resultant consequences of this trend are evidenced by high maternal mortality ratio and under-5 mortality rates (Nkhana and Abdulsalam, 2018). The World Health Organization Report (WHO, 2015) showed that although maternal mortality has been declining steadily through the years, it still remains one of the key health challenges in sub-Saharan Africa with some estimated 303,000 maternal deaths in 2015 alone (Ross and Von Xylander, 2016).





Figure 5. Infant Mortality Rate in SSAs.

The situation is further complicated by the increase in doctor-to-patient ratio, which is mainly caused by massive migration in the health labour force to advanced countries.

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region saddled with **extreme poverty** in many quarters. The region accommodates some of the poorest people in the globe. It is interesting to note that Nigeria, usually recognized as the economic giant in the region, was reportedly called the “*poverty capital of the world*”, with some 86.9 million persons living in extreme poverty in the country. Figure 6 below shows the level of poverty in the region in terms of headcount ratio.



**Figure 6.** Poverty (Headcount ratio) in SSAs.

Although poverty statistics are scanty in the region, evidence abounds that sub-Saharan Africa is home to the highest percentage of the world's "*poorest of the poor*". If the governments in the region are unable to change the current trajectory, sub-Saharan Africa will be home to some 110 million people living in extreme poverty by the year 2030.

In addition, according to the World Data Lab's Global Poverty Ranking, if the trend continues unabated, by the end of 2030, nine of the 10 countries with the poorest people will be in sub-Saharan Africa, with Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) taking the first and second positions respectively.

Water and sanitation pose another serious challenge for SSA. Reports show that in terms of accessibility to potable water and decent sanitation facilities, sub-Saharan Africa has fared relatively poorly. Despite the various governments' efforts in establishing and sustaining various water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) systems and services, health issues emanating from inaccessibility to clean water and sanitation facilities still ravage the region.

For instance, in various parts of the region, recurrent outbreaks of waterborne diseases such as cholera have continued to afflict the populace, since only an insignificant minority is able to access potable and clean water,

especially in rural communities, while a huge proportion of the population lacks access to basic sanitation facilities (UNDP, 2007).


According to UNDESA Report (2012, p.1),

Sub-Saharan Africa experiences a contrasting case with 40% of the 783 million people without access to an improved source of drinking water from the region. Sub-Saharan Africa is off track for meeting the MDG on water with just 61% water coverage and with the current pace cannot reach the 75% target set for the region.

The Report also presented a bleak scenario in terms of access to sanitation facilities. According to the Report:

Sub-Saharan Africa has a startling 30% coverage with only a 4% increase from 1990. This is a serious concern because of the associated massive health burden as many people who lack basic sanitation engage in unsanitary activities like open defecation, solid waste disposal and wastewater disposal. The practice of open defecation is the primary cause of faecal oral transmission of disease with children being the most vulnerable. (page 1)

Figure 7 shows the trend in accessibility to quality water in the region. Though the figure depicts a steady rise, the growth in the accessibility rate is relatively low. As at 2015, it was barely above 25 per cent.



**Figure 7.** Accessibility to Quality Water in SSAs.

### 3. Conceptual/Theoretical Issues

We examine the notion of economic growth, development and governance. Economic growth may be defined as an increase in GDP per capita sustained over a long period. On the other hand, economic development connotes economic growth plus structural transformation which includes governance. Theoretically, development is not possible without growth, but an economy can grow even at double digits without experiencing development.

In recent times, because growth has not resulted in development, the concept known as “inclusive growth” has been conceptualized by some scholars and has found its way into the literature of development. Inclusive growth is defined as rapid, sustained growth that is inclusive of a large portion of a country’s labour force. It stresses productive employment rather than income redistribution (Ianchovichina and Galbe, 2012).

We have argued elsewhere that the conventional definition of economic growth is not different from that of inclusive growth. “The fundamental difference lies in how the growth is distributed, the extent of the role of the state in the economy as well as that of the market. Therefore, the notion of inclusive growth is to ignore how the ‘cake’ should be distributed and reject the multidisciplinary approach to development; growth has always been inclusive – as the production possibility frontier shifts based on innovations,



ideas, knowledge and technology, an economy moves to a higher growth trajectory” (Ekpo, 2016; 2018).

A responsible government/state would then address the questions: What is happening to unemployment? What is happening to education? What is happening to health? What is happening to the provision of food, shelter, clothing and water? What is happening to poverty reduction? What is happening to growing income inequality? What is happening to gender issues? What is happening to security? These burning issues have been left to the market according to the inclusive growth approach, thus drastically reducing the role of the state in the growth-development nexus. But the market alone cannot address these issues concretely. There are instances where the state creates the market.

There cannot be development without growth but there can be growth (even if it is inclusive) without development. Countries such as India, China, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia that grew double digits in 40 years had strong public sector participation in economic activities.

Various definitions have been suggested for the concept of governance. For instance, the UNDP (1997) defines governance as “the exercise of economic and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (p. 21).

In the same vein, the Department for International Development (DFID, 2001) asserted that “governance has to do with how the institutions, rules and systems of the state – the executive, legislature, judiciary and military – operate at central and local level and how the state relates to individual citizens, civil society and the private sector” (p. 11).

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID, 2005, p.1) reveals that “governance relates to the ability of government to develop an efficient, effective and accountable public management process that is open to citizen participation and that strengthens rather than weakens a democratic system of government.” This definition was an improvement over the Agency’s former one (USAID, 2005) which was of the opinion that good

governance is a complex system of interaction among structures, traditions, functions, and processes characterized by values of accountability, transparency, and participation.

The definition offered by the United Nations (2000) showed that good governance is striving for rule of law, transparency, equity, effectiveness /efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision in the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority.

According to de Ferranti, Jacinto, Ody and Ramshaw (2009), governance describes the overall manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise their authority to shape public policy goods and services. Governance includes the functioning of political institutions, the checks and balances of the political system of a society, the capacity of the State to provide public goods and services, to implement effectively and efficiently policies and reforms, and to regulate economic activity (Rapanos and Kaplanoglou, 2014; Ang, 2017).

The United Nations has also introduced characteristics of good governance practices as being participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. These features are a global standard to be adopted by governments that receive its aid (UNESCAP, 2009). On the other hand, bad governance features bureaucracies dominated by patronage ties and non-experts; dispersed, uncoordinated policy implementation; non-transparent, risky schemes of public financing; corruption; looting and piracy.

### **3.1 Review of related literature**

The literature on the subject is vast but a brief review would be undertaken. For instance, Iyoha, Arodoye and Erediauwa (2019) investigated the relationship between fiscal policy, good governance indicators, and economic performance in ECOWAS countries for sixteen years, 2000 – 2015, and found that good governance factors have significant effect on both policy and the economic performance of ECOWAS countries. Thus, the study recommended that governments of ECOWAS countries should improve governance and give more attention to the improvement of institutional quality.

Adzima and Baita (2019) examined the impact of governance on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. The study found that governance positively influenced economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the study suggested that effective governance and the rule of law should be strengthened to improve the performance of governance on economic growth.

Ezebuilo, Ogbonna, Nwodo and Urama (2019) employed data ranging from 2001 to 2017 for 49 SSA countries in a panel framework. In the study, it was found that corruption was negatively and statistically significant to economic growth in SSA countries. On the other hand, Afolabi (2019) examined the impact of governance on sustainable development in West Africa from 2002 to 2016 and found mixed results.

Employing six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) and the system GMM approach, empirical results showed that voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness and rule of law are positively related to development, in the short run. While all the governance indicators are directly related to development in the long run (Afolabi, 2019).

Salawu, Yusuff, Salman, Ogunniyi and Rufai (2018) adopted a panel data analysis in examining the impact of governance on the economic growth of sub-Saharan Africa. The study employed data from three countries (Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana) in the region, over the period 1996 to 2016. Empirical results obtained revealed that South Africa and Ghana enjoyed better governance than Nigeria, with governance in South Africa and Ghana positively affecting economic growth. In the case of Nigeria, a negative impact was obtained. The study thus suggested that political stability and control of corruption be enhanced for effective governance and economic growth in the region.

The study by Jeleta and Takyii (2017) analysed the causal relationship between institutional quality and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Employing a panel of 27 countries for a period spanning 1996 to 2014, the study found that there is a long-run relationship between institutional quality and economic growth. In order to achieve the desired level of economic

growth in the region, the study recommended that institutional quality should be enhanced.

De Kadt and Wittels (2016) investigated the impact of democratization on economic output in sub-Saharan Africa. Employing data ranging from 1975 to 2008 in a synthetic control method, the study found that in some countries, democratization adversely affected economic output while in others it exerted an analogous positive effect.

The study by Orayo (2016) explored the relationship between good governance and economic growth among the East Africa Community (EAC) countries. Employing the major governance indicators (Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption) for the period 1999-2013 in a panel data framework, the study showed that political stability and quality regulatory were negatively related to economic growth rate. Thus, there is an urgent need to enhance more effective regulation on both public and private institutions.

Using a political economy approach, Ndulu and O'Connell (1999, p.63) argued that: "Africa's growth record reflects a groping towards satisfactory modes of national governance under objectively difficult circumstances. Following these circumstances, we emphasize particularly the shock of political independence. In most countries, neither the state, operating at a national scale, nor productive domestic capital.... existed in a meaningful sense at the time of independence."

The above conflicting results suggest the need to revisit the evidence.

#### **4. Theoretical Framework and Methodology**

Arising from the extended neoclassical model of economic growth, the model identifies physical capital, labour, knowledge and output as the explanatory variables of economic growth in any economy. Population growth, savings rate and technological progress are exogenously determined.

Thus, the production function is given as:

$$Y_t = f[K_t, A_t L_t]$$

$$Y_t = K_t^\alpha, (A_t L_t)^{1-\alpha} \quad 0 < \alpha < 1 \quad (1)$$

where:

$Y$  = output

$K$  = level of physical capital

$L$  = labour

$A$  = total productivity

Following Barro (1991), the public sector can be incorporated into equation (1) as seen below:

$$Y_t = f[K_t, G_t, A_t L_t]$$

$$Y_t = K_t^\alpha, G_t^\gamma (A_t L_t)^{1-\alpha-\gamma} \quad (\alpha + \gamma) < 1 \quad (2)$$

where  $G$  represents the public sector and other variables remains as identified.

Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) extended the Solow model by including a human capital variable and this resulted in the form below:

$$Y_t = f[K_t, H_t, G_t, A_t L_t]$$

$$Y_t = K_t^\alpha, H_t^\beta, G_t^\gamma (A_t L_t)^{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma} \quad (\alpha + \beta + \gamma) < 1 \quad (3)$$

where,  $H$  = human capital

The model developed so far partly explains our understanding of economic growth. There are several other factors, which can have, both level and growth effect on the economic growth of a country. For example, North (1990) argued that institutions in a country determine the country's long-run economic performance. In this scenario, institutions capture political stability, quality of government, independent judicial system, political rights, property rights and other institutional quality variables. Therefore, equations (1) – (3) can be manipulated to capture elements of institutions. To allow for this specification, let us assume that:

$$A_t(\theta) = A_t e^{-\eta\theta} \quad (4)$$

where:

$$0 \leq \theta \leq 1, \quad A_t = A_t e^{\bar{w}t}, \quad \bar{w} = \frac{\dot{A}}{A}$$

The parameter  $\theta$  is the index for governance. It is assumed that:

$$\frac{dA_t}{d\theta} < 0 \text{ and } \frac{d^2A_t}{d\theta^2} > 0$$

We can thus have the intensive form of production function written as:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \frac{Y_t}{L_t} = & \ln A_0 + \bar{w}t - \left[ \left\{ \frac{(\alpha + \beta + \gamma)}{(1 - \alpha - \beta - \gamma)} \right\} \ln(n + \bar{w} + \delta) \right] + \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha - \beta - \gamma)} \right\} \ln S_k + \\ & \left\{ \frac{\beta}{(1 - \alpha - \beta - \gamma)} \right\} \ln S_h + \left\{ \frac{\gamma}{(1 - \alpha - \beta - \gamma)} \right\} \ln S_g - \\ & \eta\theta \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

where:

$S_k$  = share of income invested in physical capital

$S_h$  = share of income invested in human capital

$S_g$  = share of income invested in government

$\delta$  = depreciation rate

$n$  = work force

The panel regression method was utilized for the empirical work. This method is appropriate because of the number of countries as well as the nature of the data. The data was tested for time series properties to reduce the degree of spurious regression. Data for the study was derived from the National Bureau of Statistics in Nigeria, Central Bank of Nigeria, and the World Bank.

#### 4.1 Model specification

Following the above theoretical framework, the study adopts the following model to establish the impact of governance on economic performance.

$$\begin{aligned} \ln Y_{i,t} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 VA_{i,t} + \beta_2 PS_{i,t} + \beta_3 GE_{i,t} + \beta_4 RQ_{i,t} + \beta_5 RL_{i,t} \\ & + \beta_6 CC_{i,t} + \beta_7 GS_{i,t} + \beta_8 INF_{i,t} + \beta_9 OP_{i,t} + \pi_i \\ & + v_{i,t} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

where:

*VA* = voice & accountability

*PS* = political stability

*GE* = government effectiveness

*RQ* = regulatory quality

*RL* = rule of law

*CC* = control of corruption

*GS* = government size

*INF* = inflation

*OP* = openness

It should be noted that more relevant control variables like unemployment would be arguments in equation (6) during estimation.  $i$  represents individual countries,  $t$  is time,  $\ln$  is natural log,  $\pi_i$  captures the individual country's fixed effect.  $\beta_1$  through  $\beta_9$  are elasticities to be estimated.

The data was from 47 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1996-2018. All data were taken in the natural logs (see appendix for definition of data and their measurement).

## 5. Empirical Results<sup>3</sup>

The empirical results from the estimated model derived from the theoretical framework are presented in tables 9-11 below. From table 9, unemployment, democracy and corruption have negative relationships to growth (GDPg); corruption is also statistically significant and has the expected sign. Inflation also has the expected sign and is statistically significant. It is surprising that

<sup>3</sup> Based on panel regression for 47 countries. In some cases, 38 countries were used based on data availability. Hausman test results justified preference for the fixed effects method. There were 707 observations.

capital expenditure does not have the expected positive relationship with growth. On the other hand, private investment is positively related to growth as expected and it is statistically significant.

Next we present results highlighting indicators of governance such as voice and accountability (VA), political stability (PS), government effectiveness (Ge), regulatory quality (rq), rule of law (rl), and corruption (Corrup) as they relate to growth and income per capita (proxy for economic development).

Rule of law, regulatory quality and government effectiveness are negatively related to growth with government effectiveness being statistically significant. On the other hand, political stability, voice and accountability have a positive relation with growth and are both statistically significant. The results appear reasonable with 51 per cent of the variance explained by the independent variables. The puzzling result is that of corruption whose sign is not as expected. This may be attributed to the high degree of bribery and corruption in most of the countries. In order to facilitate transactions, bribery and corruption lubricates the easy flow of business transactions. The size of government (proxied by capital expenditure) marginally relates positively to growth but is not statistically significant.

**Table 9.** Fixed Effects Panel Regression Results

GDPg	Coefficient	t-score
Unemp	-0.1670	1.28
Democracy	-1.8718	1.60
Corrup(CC)	-0.6762	2.55**
Privinv	3.8364	2.33**
Capex (GS)	-6.223	0.77
Inflation	-0.0841	4.36***
Openness	-2.429	0.36
Cons	13.696	0.91

R<sup>2</sup> = 0.36; F(14, 38) = 1.23;

\*\*significant at 5%; \*\*\*significance at 1%



**Table 10.** Fixed Effects Regression Results with Governance Indicators

GDPg	Coefficient	t-score
Govsize	.0052	0.30
Inflation	-0.162	2.72**
Openness	0.011	1.19
VA	4.1002	3.74**
Ps	0.736	2.29
Ge	-2.681	2.02**
Rq	-0.5187	0.81
Rl	-1.4707	1.01
Corrup	2.079	1.51
Cons	4.492	2.11**

R2 = 0.51; F(9, 655) = 3.91;

\*\*significance at 5%; \*significance at 1%

When it comes to income per capita (Table 11), regulatory quality, size of government, political stability and government effectiveness are positively related to income per capita implying that an increase in any or all would raise income per capita. It is interesting to note that improvement in the rule of law, voice and accountability would reduce income per capita – results are contrary to expectations. Does this justify the need for a non-democratic state or a developmental state? The results need to be interpreted with caution though the R2 seems reasonable. Furthermore, corruption and inflation are properly signed. The results based on random effects are presented in the appendix.

**Table 11.** Fixed Effects Panel Results with Governance Indicators and Income Per Capita (Y/p) as Dependent Variable

Y/p	Coefficient	t-score
Corr	-.0702	0.77
Rl	-.2006	1.64*
Rq	0.521	0.43
Govsize	0.115	0.97
Ps	0.113	1.36*

VA	-0.377	2.74**
Openness	-0.526	3.95**
Inflation	-0.167	3.07**
Ge	1.560	4.28**
Cons	3.257	1.89*

R<sup>2</sup> = .75; F(9, 655) = 13.93; \*significance at 1%; \*\*significance at 5%

## 6. Conclusion

We have examined governance, growth and economic development in SSA. The stylized facts indicate that despite SSA's average growth trajectory, economic performance was unsatisfactory as macroeconomic fundamentals such as inflation, lending rates, unemployment, among others, moved in the wrong direction during the period 1980-2018. The performance of social indices during the period under review was marginal.

The empirical results appear mixed; unemployment, democracy and corruption had negative relationship to growth (GDPg); corruption was also statistically significant and had the expected sign. Inflation also had the expected sign and was statistically significant. However, capital expenditure did not have the expected sign while private investment was positively related to growth as anticipated and was statistically significant. Concerning governance indices, rule of law, regulatory quality and government effectiveness were negatively related to growth while political stability, voice and accountability had a positive relation with growth and were both statistically significant.

With regard to income per capita, which is used as a proxy for economic development, regulatory quality, size of government, political stability and government effectiveness were positively related to income per capita implying that an increase in any or all would raise income per capita. Based on the empirical results, government in SSA should increase capital expenditures and create the enabling environment for the private sector. Furthermore, the results suggest the need for improvement in most of the indicators of governance in SSA.

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## **APPENDIX**

### **A1.**

#### **Data Interpretation and Measurements**

##### **Macroeconomic variables**

- **GDP Growth (GDPG):** This index captures the rate of growth in a country.
- **Inflation (INF):** This variable is measured as the annual percentage of the consumer price index (CPI). It serves as a macroeconomic stability indicator.
- **Openness (OP):** It is measured as a percentage of total trade to GDP. It is derived by the formula  $(\text{IMPORT} + \text{EXPORT})/\text{GDP}$ . It captures the level of openness of an economy to external shocks.
- **Government Size (GS):** This is measured as gross national expenditure as a percentage of GDP. It is an indicator of macroeconomic stability in an economy.

##### **Governance indicators**

- **Voice & Accountability (VA):** It captures how responsive a government is to its people, and it reflects the extent of democratic participation. This index ranges from 1 to 6.
- **Political Stability (PS):** This index comprises the sub-indicators and measures of government, internal and external conflicts, as well as ethnic tension.
- **Government Effectiveness (GE):** It measures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of civil services, the degree of public and civil services from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
- **Regulatory Quality (RQ):** This index measures the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
- **Rule of Law (RL):** This index measures the adherence to laws and captures the importance of government's capacity to enforce relevant fiscal policies.
- **Control of Corruption (CC):** This index assesses the level of corruption in the government systems. The index ranges between 0.5 to 6.



**Table A2.** Panel Regression Results with Random Effect with Private Investment as Dependent Variable

Prinvest	Coefficient	t-score
Public investment	0.1230	2.96**
Interest rate	-0.083	1.45*
Cor	-1.641	2.14**
y-1	.006	1.34*
Govsize	-2.724	1.50*
Cons	7.731	5.04**

R2 = 0.49; F(5, 276) = 2.90; \*\*significance at 5%; \*significance at 10%

**Table A3.** Panel Regression Results with Random Effect with Income per Capita as Dependent Variable

Y/p	Coefficient	t-score
Govsize	-0.0302	0.19
Inflation	-0.0022	4.62**
Openness	-0.0011	2.09**
VA	0.186	2.22**
Ps	-0.109	2.42**
Ge	-0.713	6.82**
rq	0.230	2.35**
rl	0.699	6.05**
Cor	0.044	0.42
Cons	7.365	9.424**

R2 = 0.17; \*significance at 10%; \*\*significance at 5%

**A4.****List of Countries**

S/N	Country	S/N	Country
1.	Angola	21.	Mali
2.	Benin	22.	Mauritania
3.	Burkina Faso	23.	Mauritius
4.	Botswana	24.	Malawi
5.	Central African Republic	25.	Namibia
6.	Côte d'Ivoire	26.	Niger
7.	Cameroon	27.	Nigeria
8.	Congo, Dem. Rep.	28.	Rwanda
9.	Congo, Rep.	29.	Sudan
10.	Comoros	30.	Senegal
11.	Gabon	31.	Sierra Leone
12.	Ghana	32.	Seychelles
13.	Guinea	33.	Chad
14.	Gambia, The	34.	Togo
15.	Guinea-Bissau	35.	Tanzania
16.	Equatorial Guinea	36.	Uganda
17.	Kenya	37.	South Africa
18.	Liberia	38.	Zimbabwe
19.	Lesotho		
20.	Madagascar		